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Faculty and Deans

The Telecommunications Act of 1996

THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER"

President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 19961
("1996 Act," "new Act," or "Act'') on February 8, 1996.2 By that time,
the spin masters were already in high gear, heaping superlatives on the
bill. Clinton said the new Act was ''truly revolutionary legislation that
will bring the future to our doorstep."3 I hope here to provide a somewhat more sober assessment of the bill. After all, a statute that defines
''telecommunications" in a manner such that it includes the act of mailing a letter or throwing a newspaper on the lawn, cannot be all that
special.4
Two features of this article should be noted at the outset because
they somewhat limit its scope. First, every sentence in the remainder of
this article is (at least a bit of) an over-generalization. This is a warn-

• Dean and Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. I wish to thanJc Tom
Koonce for his research assistance and F. John Barker for his edllorlal assistance. I am gratefol to participants in the AA1S Mass Media Law workshop and the William and Mary School
of Law Colloquium series. I also ll'ish to point out that at note /9S infra I disclose a minor,
potential conflict of interest
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. I 04-104, II 0 Stat 56 (to be codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. Mike Mills, Ushering in a New Age in Communications: Clinton Signs 'Rel·olutlonary'
Bill into Law at a Ceremony Packed with Symbolism, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1996, at Cl.
3. President William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Telecommunications Act Conference Report (Feb. 8, 1996) (text of speech can be found at White House
Home Page (virtual libnuy) http://lwww.whitehouse.gov/\VHnttmlllibnuy.html).
4. "The term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without chl!.llge in the form or content
of the information as sent and received." See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(a)(2), adding 47 U.S.C. § 153(r)(48).
As written, this section describes equally well a person mailing a letter l!.lld the same
person sending a fax or telephoning and leaving a message on the recipient's answering machine.
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ing, not a boast. The 1996 Act is a very lengthy and very detailed bill.
Fonnally written as a series of amendments and additions to the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") basic
charter, the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"),5 the committee
print of the law is Ill pages long. Major changes are made in the law
affecting regulation of broadcasting, both radio and television, as well
as cable and telephony. Less extensive alterations occur in satellite and
spectrum regulation and in the FCC's own processes.
Given the new Act's breadth and depth, no article about it can be
simultaneously and consistently readable, fully comprehensive, and
utterly complete. If one is to say helpful or sensible things about the
1996 Act, one must to some extent speak broadly. Nevertheless, I remain quite sensitive to the charge that this article may appear to contain more pontificating than analysis; I hope that citations to underlying
research, much of which I conducted myself, will further help to convince the reader that I have thought about these issues seriously. 6
Second, for the most part, what the article says takes for granted
the utility of a federal communications commission. This is not an idle
point. The 1996 Act does no more than did the 1934 Act (or its predecessor, the Radio Act of 19277) to explain a fundamental, but very
contestable, policy choice that underlies U.S. regulation of telecommunications markets: Congress decided, in 19278 and again in 1934,9 to
regulate these markets through an industry-specific federal commission.
No other medium of communication in this country is regulated in this
fashion; we have no Federal Computer Commission or Federal Newspaper Commission, no Federal Internet Agency or National Institute of
Theatrical Productions. There may, indeed, be good reasons why Congress created the FCC rather than simply subjecting owners of broadcast stations, cable systems, and telephone wires and switches to laws
of general applicability - such as antitrust, labor and securities laws.

5. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§
151-610).
6. See THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER, TELECOMM. LAW & POLICY {1994) (hereinafter TLP).
When I cite to this casebook, I am usually citing to primary sources, or to the research work
of others, as well. See also THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCASTING PROGRAMMING (1994) (hereinafter RBP); STANLEY M. BENSEN ET AL.,
MISREGULATING TELEVISION: NETWORK DoMINANCE AND THE FCC {1984) (hereinafter MTV].
7. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat 1162, repealed by Communications
Act of 1934, 48 Stat 1064.
8. TLP, supra note 6, at 11-17.
9. /d. at 20-21.
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But we do not know what these reasons are; we do know they are not
self-evident.
One has to choose, then, between criticizing U.S. telecommunications law from within or without. Criticism from within would ask
whether the 1996 Act is a good thing, given the presence and purposes
of the FCC. Analysis from without would question whether the 1996
Act cogently identifies and then remedies defects in pre-existing, industry-neutral law as it would apply to telecommunications firms or markets. In this article, I choose largely to criticize from within the existing paradigm, although I drop this constraint in the conclusion. To take
a concrete example, when Congress writes anti-monopoly provisions for
certain telecommunications markets only and entrusts enforcement of
them to the FCC, I do not ask in this article why the matter was not
left to other federal agencies enforcing general antitrust principles.
Rather, I ask only whether Congress seems to have devised wise rules,
as they apply to the markets at issue.
I. STATIJS QUO ANTE

What was the problem? Why did Congress think a major overhaul
of much of the telecommunications act was in order? What is the context within which we should read the 1996 Act? The answer, in two
phrases, is "technological convergence" and "legal balkanization."
A. Technological Convergence

"Telecommunications" is, quite simply, the electronic transmission
of information (in audio, video, or simple data form). 10 The electronic
data transmission is encoded at the sending end so that it may flow
through the ether (the electromagnetic spectrum) at the speed of light
or through wires (copper, coaxial cable, fiber optic, whatever) at very
rapid speeds. 11 At the receiving end, the encoded information is decoded.lz
As this simple description shows, telecommunications has value to
people because it can transmit information very quickly and over long
distances. 13 In this regard, telecommunications is, except for its elec10.
11.
12.
13.

/d. at 29-31.
Jd. at 30-31.
/d. at 30-31.

In many cases, telecommunications transmissions can also be rendered (rclnlivcly) secure
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tronic features, like smoke signals. 14 These, too, are data transmission
systems that carry information, encoded on one end and decoded at the
other, at the speed of light. Telecommunications technology is largely
regarded as an advancement over smoke signal technology because it
can carry more information per second, carry it a greater distance, and
provide more security against surreptitious monitoring. 15
Thus, when Morse, Bell, and Marconi invented the telegraph, telephone, and wireless transmitter respectively, each pushed us further
along a path already trod. What they added to the process of information transfer was the use of electrical energy to drive the system.
All this was comparatively new when Congress wrote the Communications Act of 1934. Everything seemed much simpler then. Electronic communications moved through either the air or wires. 16
The market for communications through wires was a natural monopoly - who ever heard of two communications wires going into the
same house? - and so the telephone and telegraph (after which the
monopolist AT&T was named) were to be regulated as common carriers. Accordingly, those who wrote Title II of the 1934 Act essentially
copied from the Interstate Commerce Act the then-standard features of
public utility regulation and subjected telegraphy and telephony (i.e.,
AT&n to such oversight. 17
Conversely, electronic communication through the spectrum was
broadcasting. This market was dominated by three radio networks
(owned by two firms, CBS and NBC) 18 and so the task of regulation
was to choose ''the worthiest" applicants for stations and then to let
them compete for listeners' attention. 19 This competition would be kept
within the bounds of good taste by the Commission's oversight of
programming practices.20
In 1934, then, telecommunications were characterized by technological balkanization. Telecommunication by wire was a natural monopoly,

from eavesdroppers, thus increasing their value.
14. The smoke signal analogy is suggested by DoN L. CANNON & GERALD LUECKE, UN·
DERSTANDING COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS l (2d ed. 1984).
15. TLP, supra note 6, at 29.
16. See id. at 20.
17. Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History, TELECOMM. POL'Y, July 1993,
at 354.
18. See NE1WORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FCC, NEW TELEVISION NE1WORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION VOL. 11 49-59 (1980) [hereinafter NISS VOL. 11].
19. TLP, supra note 6, at 20 & 77-84.
20. /d. at 14-17.
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subject to common carrier regulation, characterized by speaker and
listener privacy and virtually devoid of censorship. Telecommunication
through the air was broadcasting, a conversation open to everyone,
conducted through workable competitive markets, while censored by the
FCC.
That was then. What is now? The perception of technological
balkanization has yielded to the reality of technological convergence.
Since the 1934 Act, we have witnessed satellites, microwave, television,
computers (with their transistors and microprocessors), fiber optics, and
the World Wide Web. These have shattered our previous illusion of
tightly compartmentalized technologies.
Today, most Americans receive their television programming over a
wire, the medium we call "cable television."21 Millions of telephone
calls every day in the U.S. are broadcast from cellular (mobile) telephones.22 It would probably be impossible, and certainly difficult, to
define today the difference between a telephone and a computer. Tomorrow, it will be equally challenging to distinguish a television set
with a VCR and a cable connection from a computer with a monitor,
CD-ROM, and a good modem.
In short, telecommunications technology is converging. More precisely, as illustrated by the preceding examples, we are witnessing a
convergence of devices accompanied by a plethora of transmission
paths. The telecommunications receiver is a radio, computer, television,
telephone, VCR, and fax machine all rolled into one. We can get information to such devices by broadcast, microwave, satellite, tape or disk,
copper wire, or optic fiber. 23
B. Legal Balkanization

Confronting, and obstructing, these technological developments were
(and, to some extent, still are) a series of governmentally imposed entry
barriers that sought to force the new and the old technologies into a
Procrustean bed. These barriers attempted both to confine certain devices to certain limited uses and to limit the transmission paths telecommunications providers might employ.

21. /d. at 24-25.
22. U.S. Subscriber Base Increases by 36 Percent, MOBILE PHONE NEVlS, Mnr. 25, 1996,
no. 13, vol. 14, ISSN: 0737-5077.
23. See TLP, supra note 6, at 29-35.
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For example, all of these assertions were true at the end of 1995
(and some still are): television stations cannot operate local cable systems;24 but cable systems must carry television stations.25 (On the other
hand, firms sending multiple television signals to the home via satellite
are effectively prevented from carrying network television stations. 26)
Telephone companies cannot offer cable television27 - and cable television companies cannot offer telephonf8 - although both run wires for
electronic communications into the same houses. In several states, almost everyone except the incumbent phone company is barred from
offering telephone service to residential subscribers.29 Here is one Rube
Goldberg might have admired: most local telephone companies cannot
offer long distance service/ 0 nor can they manufacture31 (although they
can sell)32 telecommunications equipment, but they can sell real estate/3
although they may not offer cable television programming,34 unless they
neither select nor own the programs.35 Broadcast stations may also use
their frequencies to transmit some information to private, paying subscribers but only types of information authorized by the FCC.36
Why did we encounter all these entry barriers? Usually, for one of
two reasons. The first, and most frequent explanation, is that we (claim
to) fear predation. The issue of telephone entry into cable illustrates the
two kinds of predation feared, discriminatory interconnection and predatory cross-subsidization. If telephone companies are allowed to offer
cable television, it is said, they will be in a uniquely advantageous
position to prey against their cable rivals. First, telephone companies
could raise their cable rivals' costs by denying cable equal access to

24. 47 C.F.R § 76.50l(a)(2) (1996).
25. TLP, supra note 6, at 354-76.
26. Section 119 of the Copyright Act gives satellite providers the practically necessary "compulsory license" for network stations only in those few areas not served by conventional or
cable television. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1996).
27. TLP, supra note 6, at 565-87.
28. /d.
29. See, e.g., In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, 1996 FCC LEXIS 2063, ~ 5 (Apr. 16, 1996).
30. TLP, supra note 6, at 543-53 (citing United States v. Westevil Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
31. TLP, supra note 6, at 543-53.
32. /d. at 507-08.
33. /d. at 544.
34. /d. at 565-87.
35. /d. at 565-87.
36. ld. at 55-58.
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necessary facilities, such as pole attachments.37 I refer to this tactic
generically as discriminatory interconnection. Second, while raising their
cable rivals' costs, the telephone companies (telcos) could simultaneously artificially underprice their cable rivals by hiding costs of telcos'
cable services in the costs of providing telephone dial tones. I call this
tactic predatory cross-subsidization.38
A second, less frequently voiced, justification for legal balkanization
of telecommunications is that we (claim to) fear disruption of a system
of pro-social internal cross-subsidies. Local, residential phone subscription rates are as low as they are not because costs are that low but
because we force the phone companies to jack up business rates in
order to depress residential rates.39 Taking money from businesses and
giving it to consumers is said to be pro-social, regardless of the relative
costs of the services involved. If we permit cable systems to offer
phone service, they will just target the business users. This "cream
skimming" will deny phone companies the wherewithal to subsidize
residents' rates, which will therefore increase. Taking money from consumers and giving it to businesses is said to be anti-social, regardless
of the relative costs of the services involved.
C. Motives for the 1996 Act
From the vantage point just sketched out, we can discern the key
reasons for the 1996 Act. I believe Congress and other opinion leaders
reached three overriding conclusions about telecommunications law and
policy that underlie the core of the new Act.
First, a consensus formed that the issue(s) of technological convergence should be answered more commonly by marketplace forces, less
frequently by regulatory fiat. Policy makers believe (or profess to believe) that if telephony, radio, and television are to merge -or not to
merge - that result should be driven by consumers making choices in
open markets that express their preferences. Regulation is at most a
second best method for deciding who will offer what telecommunica-

37. This is what Steve Salop and 1 call the "bottleneck" method or raising rivals' costs. See
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anlicompetith·e Exclusion: Raising Rr;a/s' Costs to
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 234-36 (1986).
38. This is a sophisticated, or special case of, predatory pricing. Unlike most a11eged predatory pricing schemes, this one does not require the sacrifice or profits in the short run. For a
fuller discussion see TI..P, supra note 6, at 510-12 & 514-23.
39. /d. at 467.

130

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:123

tions services to whom.
As noted, however, unleashing market forces might also just lead to
monopolistic predation rather than open bazaars in which many firms
flourish. Accompanying the conclusion that we should subject convergence issues to the marketplace, then, was the conclusion that predation
could (perhaps must) be avoided by appropriate regulatory oversight.
The FCC's job description needed to be rewritten. The agency should
not decide who could enter what markets, but rather should monitor the
conditions under which such entry took place and the responses to such
entry by those already there ("entrenched interests," if you prefer).40
Tear down entry barriers, but replace them with specific regulatory
instruments to hu.nt down predators.
Were this the entire story, it would be comparatively simple to
retell. Indeed, we might then note that the 1996 Act was, at bottom,
just an extension of the philosophy underlying the 1983 antitrust consent decree pursuant to which AT&T was broken into several parts.41
But a third policy conclusion, beyond the preference for competition
among technologies monitored by predator hunters, also deeply affects
the new Act.
That conclusion is the continuing conviction that markets for telecommunications services ought to be governmentally managed so that
they provide - and to some extent conceal - pro-social cross-subsidies. Baldly stated, non-predatory competition is not good if it leads to
higher residential subscription rates for basic telephone services. Competition among broadcasters should not be permitted to generate a television system that does not provide closed-captioning, without charge,
to everyone, or that does provide too much violence or talk about sex.
Think, then, of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as an effort to
hit a legislative trifecta: 42 (1) Entry barriers will be torn down so that
legal balkanization no longer stands in the path of technological convergence. (2) As cross-cutting entry subsequently takes place all over the
telecommunications field, the FCC will be charged with ferreting out
predators and given special regulatory tools for this task. (3) Lest the
new competition harm the most vulnerable, pro-social43 cross-subsidies
40. As we shall see, it is this conclusion especially that accounts for the fact that the new
Act is just about as much regulatory as it is deregulatory in its provisions and effects.
41. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), a.if'd 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
42. As explained in greater detail below, these three goals are not easily compatible with
each other. Some of the law's less satisfactory aspects arise from its attempts to achieve simultaneously inconsistent goals.
43. I assume it is clear by now (if there was ever any doubt) that one cannot determine
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will be maintained and even added to the value produced by telecommunications firms and markets. 44

II. HEADLINERS
Specifically, what did the 1996 Act do? An abbreviated version of
it is appended to this Article, but I edited over half the words out of
the Act to produce the appendix. Here, I am even less detailed, trying
to identify the major changes and to do so in reasonably brief fashion.

A. Controls over Industry Structure and Commercial Practices
The FCC has regulated telecommunications markets through controls imposed on industry structure or commercial practices (process
regulations) much more frequently than it has imposed content (or outcome) regulations. Many headlines about the Act emphasized its censorship features, discussed below, but most of its provisions affect industry
structure and commercial activity.
1. Radio
The 1996 Act drops all limits on the number of AM and FM radio
station licenses that any owner may control nationwide.45 It also substantially raises the number of stations that may be commonly owned in
any one market, varying the multiple ownership limit with the size of
the market.46 Of course, antitrust law continues to supply an upper limit
on station consolidation.

whether a cross-subsidy is "pro-social" without fust mnking importmt, subjective value judgments, such as whether services should be provided below cost or how much v;e dislike gratuitous 1V violence.
44. I am speaking here, of course, of the 1996 Act as it \\ill be described in law, which
requires that a public-regarding purpose be articulated as the basis for the statute. See, e.g., the
discussion of "rational basis review" in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CossnnmoNAL LAw
532-38 (2d. ed. 1991). Outside courts of law, many better (or more interesting) ways to lllllllyze the Act might be employed. For example, one might compare the sources and amounts of
political action committee ("PAC") donations with fmal provisions in the Bill. Senators and
Representatives may have voted for the Act out of a conviction that this was the best way to
maximize their PAC contributions, their chances for reelection, or their likelihood of immortality, but these are beside the point of this article.
45. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(a), modifying 47 C.F.R. 73.3555 (1996).
46. /d. § 202(b)(1), modifying 47 C.F.R. 73.3555 (1996). The new Act also changes, but
less drastically, the group ownership rules applicable to television. /d. § 202(c), modfh·ing 47
C.F.R. 73.3555 (1996).
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2. Television
The next big development in television is expected to be the arrival
of high definition television (HDTV). 47 This new method of propagating
television signals produces a much clearer, richer, more textured picture
- akin to what one sees watching a 35mm film in a movie theater.
HDTV signals, however, are incompatible with conventional television signals and so must be transmitted on a different frequency and
cannot be decoded by conventional television sets. This creates a real
transition problem: how does one offer HDTV without forcing all viewers to buy new sets right away't8
Several years ago, the FCC decided that it should manage the process of transition from conventional to HDTV technology and that conventional television broadcasters should take the lead in implementing
HDTV. Conventional U.S. television stations broadcast in either the
VHF (very high frequency) spectrum, where we locate channels 2-13,
or the UHF (ultra high frequency) spectrum, where we locate channels
20-70. The agency determined that it could scrounge up enough UHF
spectrum to give almost every existing full-strength television VHF or
UHF broadcaster another 6 MHz, the bandwidth presently assigned for
each television station. The Commission's initial plan was that each
broadcaster would be offered an additional channel, on which it could
broadcast HDTV, and that at some future time - presumably after
most U.S. households had acquired HDTV sets - broadcasters would
then be required to surrender one of their channels.
Two things happened shortly after that initial plan was announced.
(1) The Commission started auctioning off spectrum that was being
newly devoted to new common carrier technologies and the bidding
went through the roof. 49 Politicians became enamored of the idea that
47. Unless otherwise indicated the data presented here with respect to HDTV may all be
found at 1LP, supra note 6, at 281-93.
48. The puzzle is thus like that faced by the FCC when it moved the FM radio band. /d.
All FM broadcasters' equipment became obsolete overnight and consumers had no radios (decoders) that could receive the new FM signals. The FM industry became a weak step-sister to
the AM radio industry instantly and stayed that way for over two decades. See SYDNEY W.
HEAD & CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 152-53 (1982). The puzzle is
not like that faced by the Commission when color television was introduced. One does not
need a color-equipped set to receive a color-encoded signal. Consumers do not need color receivers to decode transmissions of programs that are coded for color.
49. See Mike Allen, Wireless Systems Put Out Their Antennas, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1996
at A29; see also George Graham, U.S. Broadband License Bids Start Today: Government Hopes
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spectrum auctions might materially reduce the national debt.50 (2) Digital technology overtook analog technology and it is now agreed that
any HDTV transmissions will be digital.51 The 6 MHz channels will
therefore be quite ample to broadcast four or five conventional signal~2
at once or HDTV plus some other types of information or two HDTV
signals.53 Putting (1) and (2) together made some people realize the
enormity of the give-away the FCC had proposed.
The 1996 Act essentially protects the deal the broadcasters first
wrung out of the Commission. Congress instructs the FCC that if the
agency decides ''to issue additional licenses for advanced television
services,"54 it "should limit the initial eligibility for such licenses,55 to
existing television broadcasters. Since one cannot conduct an auction
with only one bidder, this ends the auction idea.56
3. Broadcasting

Two features of the new Act combine to grant virtually perpetual
licenses to all radio and television stations. The basic term for all

for World's Largest Auction of Public Assets in Forthcoming Wlrele.u Persoll!ll Telecoms Selloff, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1994, at 7.
50. See Edmund L. Andrews, Digital Tv. Dollars and Dissent; The Political Battle Grows
over the Use of New Broadcast Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Mnr. 18, 1996, at Dl; see also Paul
Farhi Clinton Proposes Radio Spectrum Auction; Benefits for Dejicfl, New Communications
Technologies Seen, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at 812.
51. See Tom Foremski, The Key Challenge Is Price • The Cost of Digital Televlslon Sets
Will Come Dov:n in Price as New Chips Are Dl!l·eloped, FIN. TIMES, 1\inr. 6, 1996, at XI.
52. Paul Farhi, FCC Gathering to Decide on Fate of HDTV; Broadcasters Want Alnrcn-es
for W"ueless Communications, WASH. POST, July 27, 1995, at 89.
53. FCC Chainnan Reed Hundt, Speech at the Museum of Television & Rndio (June 6,
1996) (transcript available in < http://www.fcc.gov/Specches/Hundtlsprch626.bct>).
54. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(a).
SS. !d. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(a)(l).
56. There is an infonnal agreement in Congress that the issue of whether to auction HDTV
channels may be revisited in the next year. Inertia suggests there will be no auctions. So does
the extraordinazy political clout broadcasters possess. However, the broadcasters did not get
everything they may have wished for in this section of the AcL Other provisions tell the Commission to allow the holders of the new HDlV licenses to offer "ancilliuy or supplemental"
services, (see id. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(a)(2)) but to collect a fee (roughly equivalent
to what an auction would have brought) for any services for which the licensee charges. (See
id. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(e)(1).) Additionally, if the FCC docs give cac:h broadcaster
an extra channel it must require that, at some appropriate time, either the original or the additional license be surrendered. (See id. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(c).)

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

134

[Vol. 29:123

broadcasting licenses is extended to eight years. 57 Additionally, at renewal time, the Commission must grant the application of the incumbent broadcaster if the agency finds that the licensee "served the public
interest,"58 committed "no serious violations"59 of the Communications
Act or of the FCC's rules, and has not committed any other violations
"which, taken together, would constitute a pattern of abuse.'x;o Only if
the incumbent-applicant flunks one of these tests61 and only if the
Commission then determines that a sanction short of non-renewal is not
appropriate may the Commission consider an outsider's application. 62
Comparative hearings in which an incumbent is an applicant have produced volumes of legal wrangling, but almost no license denials. 63 Now
such hearings are a thing of the past.
4. Cable
The new Act makes two major changes in cable regulation. One
reduces entry barriers. The other sunsets some rate regulation.
a. Reduced Entry Barriers
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act,
prohibiting telephone companies ("telcos") from offering cable television
service directly to subscribers in their service areas. 64 Subsequent FCC
interpretations of this law, embedded in the agency's so-called ''video
dial tone" rules, had substantially narrowed the force of the cable/telco
ban. 65 The rules permitted phone companies to offer distinct cable tele57. /d. §203, amending 47 U.S.C. § 307(c){I).
58. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(I)(A).
59. ld. § 204(a)(l), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(I)(B).
60. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(l)(C).
61. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(I).
62. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(2).
63. TLP, supra note 6, at 89-120.
64. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat 2779 (1984). See also TLP, supra note 6, at 567. This Is
a classic example of the "legal balkanization" discussed above. Congress feared that telephone
companies might be able to prey successfully against cable systems and so banned their participation in cable television. Meanwhile, converging technologies made it more and more difficult
to determine just what was "cable television programming" and what was "telephone service"
(Consider, for example, video images transmitted over the Internet).
65. TLP, supra note 6, at 567-87.
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vision services to their customers if the companies operated on a common carrier basis, not selecting the programming they transmitted. The
video dial tone rules, however, prohibited phone companies from offering cable services in their service area if the telco played a major role
in choosing the programming on its system.66
The 1996 Act repeals both the telco ban67 and the FCC's video dial
tone rules,68 replacing the old scheme with one that allows telephone
companies (or anyone else) to offer cable television while these new
entrants also choose from a menu of regulatory options as to how they
will be regulated. 69 New cable companies (or "multi-video program
distributors" (MVPD) as the FCC likes to call them) may operate like,
and be regulated as, broadcasters70 or common carriers71 or cable companies72 or as something new: open video systems73 (which bear a striking resemblance to video dial tone systems)."'
b. Sunsetting (Some) Rate Regulation
Perhaps in part because Congress had kept telephone companies
from offering competition to cable systems, Congress found in 1992
that cable systems enjoyed monopoly power. So Congress heaped on
more regulation, in this case price regulation of cable services.75 The
1992 Cable Act required every cable system that was not subject to
effective competition76 to divide its services into a basic tier, a cable
programming tier, and other services such as pay per view or pay per
channel.
The latter, such as HBO or Showtime, receive no rate regulation

66. /d.
67. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 302(b)(l), repealing 41 U.S.C. § 533(b).
68. /d. § 302(b)(3).
69. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 651(a).
70. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2).
71. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2).
72. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 6S1(a)(3).
73. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 6S1(a)(4).
74. See, e.g., /d. § 302(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 6S1(b)(l).
75. lLP, supra note 6, at 442-60.
76. "Effective competition" was defmed so that few cable systems were subject to it and
therefore exempt from rate regulation. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. 1- No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
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under the 1992 Act. 77 Rates for the basic tier, essentially retransmitted
local stations plus public access channels and imported super-stations
(e.g., WTBS, WGN), are regulated by states or localities following
rules set down by the FCC. 78 Rules for an intennediate tier, what I call
the cable programming tier, which contains the cable networks for
which viewers are not charged separately79 (such as 1NT, MTV, ESPN,
BET), are regulated by the FCC. 80
The 1996 Act, as it unleashes telephone companies into the cable
market, also unshackles existing cable systems from rate regulation of
their cable programming tiers as of 1999.81 If all goes according to
Congress' plan (or hope), moreover, even more rate deregulation will
occur. Cable rate regulation of any sort is authorized only when the
cable system is not subject to "effective competition."82 The Act treats
as subject to "effective competition" any cable system that confronts a
real rival in its market. 83 If telephone companies (or other utilities, such
as electrical or water or gas, that also run lines into our homes) successfully initiate cable services, then both the incumbent companies and
the newcomers will be subject to "effective competition" and therefore
freed of rate regulation. 84
5. Telephones
As just mentioned, the 1996 Act frees telcos to enter cable television markets in any (non-predatory) manner they see fit. The new Act
makes three other major changes in the regulation of telephone services.
To understand the first two, one must first know the basics of the 1983
consent decree that divested AT&T of its local operating companies.

77. TLP, supra note 6, at 442.
78. /d.
79. Viewers do pay for most of these services, but not separately. Rather, each cable program network usually charges the cable operator a set fee per month per subscriber and the
cable system that carries that network then sets the fee for its cable programming tier high
enough to cover those charges. Think of the non-basic and non-per-channel part of your cable
line-up as one gigantic tie-in, if you will (Well it's better than thinking of how to write one
sentence that contains frve hyphenated words!).
80. TLP, supra note 6, at 442.
81. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 301(b)(I)(C), adding 41 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4).
82. TLP, supra note 6, at 442.
83. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 301(b)(3), amending 41 U.S.C. § 543(1)(1).
84. /d. § 301(b)(3)(C), adding 41 U.S.C. § 543(1)(1)(0).
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The consent decree (or modified final judgment or ''MFJ")85 rested
on the premise that the Bell System had used the power of its monopoly local exchange carriers ("LECs") to gain power in markets that
could have been competitive, such as providing long distance services
or manufacturing phones, switches, and wires.86 Accordingly, the MFJ
(1) took its LECs away from AT&T, and (2) set AT&T largely free
from regulation to compete in long-distance and equipment markets,87
while (3) preventing these newly divorced Bell operating companies
("BOCs", a sub-species of LECs - since some local phone companies
were never formerly owned by AT&T) from getting into such markets
as long distance and manufacturing.88 These latter restrictions, just like
the liberation of AT&T, followed from the underlying logic of the
consent decree: 89 AT&T's power came from the LECs/BOCs; now that
the BOCs were divorced from AT&T, AT&T could not find its old
predatory tactics profitable, but the BOCs might adopt those tactics for
the same reasons (and with the same successes) as had AT&T.g.o
The 1996 Act essentially reflects two important new policy conclusions about the 1983 consent decree. First, some important provisions
of the new Act rest on the conclusion that we may be able to cut the
Gordian knot, to avoid choosing between complete exclusion of the
former BOCs from competitive markets or permitting entry only under
heavy regulatory constraints. We clearly would be able to avoid this
choice were there competition in the local loop. Perhaps if local exchange carriers were forced to make their switches and wires available
to anyone who wished to offer telephone services through the LECs'
facilities, competitive markets in the provision of telephone exchange
services might emerge. So certain sections of the new Act promise an
"everyone into LECs" regime, under which any firm can acquire access
to LEC facilities to offer competitive services. (As explained below,
these provisions apply to all local exchange carriers, not only to those

85. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), offd 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
86. 1LP, supra note 6, at 510-13.
87. /d. at 499-505.
88. /d. at 505-09.
89. /d. at 513.
90. Please: you do not have to believe the underlying story. I lll11 not sure I do. AT&T
may not have committed all these predatory acts. Even if it did, one BOC may not have the
same opportunity profitably to prey, as I argue below. The point is only that the MFJ rested
on this account of how AT&T acquired and maintained such size and breadth and on the assumption that the newly created BOCs would enjoy the same opportunities that AT&T had
exploited.
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that formerly were Bell companies.)
Second, other important portions of the new Act rest on the conclusion that, at least until competition in the local loop becomes a reality,
the best way to protect competitive markets - such as long distance or
equipment manufacturing - that former Bell operating companies
might wish to enter is not to ban BOCs' entrance into those markets,
but to permit entry subject to regulatory constraints. Accordingly, the
"BOCs into everything" provisions of the bill abolish all remaining line
of business restrictions imposed by the consent decree. A panoply of
regulatory constraints are imposed on BOCs who enter these newly
opened markets.
Finally, the Act also codifies for the first time the regulatory goal
of "universal service." I discuss that section after reviewing the provisions growing out of the aftermath of the consent decree.
a. Everyone into LECs
Many provisions of the Act are important to this point, but the key
is new section 251, added to Title II. Entitled "Interconnection," this
provision imposes general duties of access and nondiscrimination on
every "telecommunications carrier''91 and each "local exchange carrier''
(LEC). 92 More substantial obligations are imposed on "incumbent local
exchange carriers,"93 that is, the local exchange carriers in existence
when the act was passed. (More simply, your present local telephone
company.)
These incumbent LECs are required to provide, at just and reasonable rates, interconnection with their networks for the transmission and
routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access at any feasible point within the LECs' networks. 94 They must provide nondiscriminatory access at reasonable cost to network elements on an unbundled
basis at any technically feasible point and in a manner that allows the
requesting party to combine the network elements to provide a
telecommunications service.95 The incumbent LECs must permit each of
their services to be resold and must offer for sale at wholesale rates

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Telecommunications Act
/d. § IOI(a), adding 47
/d. § IOI{a), adding 47
/d. § IOI(a), adding 47
Id. § IOI(a), adding 47

of 1996 § IOI(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2Sl(a).
U.S.C. § 2Sl(b).
U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(l).
U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(2).
U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(3).

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996

1996]

139

any services they offer at retail to customer-subscribers.96 They must
provide reasonable public notice of new infonnation necessary to transmit and route services over their facilities and networks.97 They must
pennit finns seeking interconnection to locate their equipment on the
incumbent LECs' premises (known as "collocation" to the industry).93
In addition to these special obligations imposed on incumbent
LECs, both incumbent and subsequent LECs are also required to provide number portabili~ (so that customers can move from one phone
company to another, but keep their phone numbers). All LECs must
also provide dialing parity100 (entrenched finn A and newcomer B must
provide the same system of dialing for, say, directory assistance or long
distance access). And all local phone companies must provide access to
their poles, ducts, conduits, and rights of way to competing providers
of telecommunications services. 101
What does this all mean? Simply put, every entrenched local exchange carrier must open its facilities up to new rivals who may employ those facilities, acquired at reasonable rates and on nondiscriminatory tenns, to offer competing services. If a finn wants to offer "call
waiting'' services to Bell Atlantic's residential subscribers, it may "interconnect to" any relevant parts of Bell Atlantic's system to create a call
waiting service. The same holds for a finn that may wish to offer message routing services to brokerage houses or to provide teleconferencing
services within a particular city. The finn need not build that which the
incumbent LEC has already built; the entrant may just plug into it, at
prices deemed fair by the FCC.
Competition in long distance telephone markets developed by an
arguably analogous process. 102 Outfits like MCI and (the forerunners of)
Sprint built rather small operations that interconnected only two or
three cities. They were then pennitted, however, to interconnect their
system to AT&T's (over AT&T's objection). In this manner, MCI's St.
Louis to Chicago line could become a St Louis to Chicago to the
entire world line. From such bases, these new entrants acquired the
customer base from which to build their own complete networks.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

ld. §
!d. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
TLP,

101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A).
101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(S).
lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(6).
lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(b)(2).
lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(b)(3).
101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(b)(4).
supra note 6, at 477-79 & 485-89.
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Conceivably (hopefully, if you voted for the 1996 Act), local telephony markets may prove accessible to just such incremental competitive growth. Perhaps new carriers will build better networks inside the
existing local loops or will disaggregate the existing structures and sell
their components at lower prices.
b. BOCs into Everything
The 1996 Act adds to Title II of the 1934 Act a new Part III,
called "Special Provisions Concerning Bell Operating Companies."103
New section 271 pennits the BOCs to offer long distance telephone
service. Section 273 allows the BOCs to manufacture telecommunications equipment (i.e., the wires and switches, and associated software,
that make up the local loop) and customer premises equipment (i.e., the
handsets and switchboards that connect individuals and offices to the
local loop). All of these activities were forbidden by the MFJ. 104
The consent decree also kept the BOCs out of "infonnation services,"105 a vague tenn that essentially embraced providing data that the
phone company had assembled or acted upon. 106 That restriction was
removed in subsequent court proceedings, 107 but a new section 274 now
governs "electronic publishing" by the BOCs. The Act contains a laundry list definition of electronic publishing, describing several types of
data that are included in the tenn and others that are not. 108 Essentially,
"electronic publishing" is the transmission by a phone company of
infonnation that the company has generated or altered. The definition
is, in other words, very close to that employed in the consent decree. 109
As noted, the purpose of these provisions is to remove the absolute
entry barriers that the MFJ's line of business restrictions imposed on

103. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a).
104. lLP, supra note 6, at 505-07.
105. /d. at 506.
106. /d. at 550-53 (citing United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F2d 1572 (D.C. Clr.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S 984 (1993)). Nynex could not supply a stock quotation system for
which it had assembled the data, but it could transmit a ticker service whose content was managed by others.
107. lLP, supra note 6, at 550-53.
108. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 274(h).
109. The 1996 Act also addresses two lines of business not expressly covered by the MFJ.
New section 275 regulates a BOC provision of alarm monitoring services. New section 276 sets
new ground rules for any Bell operating company that provides pay phone services.
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the BOCs and to substitute a system of regulated entry to guard against
potential predation or discrimination by the BOCs against their rivals
who do not control local exchange facilities. What types of regulations
are substituted? You name any and you'll find it here. Various provisions dealing with various practices impose various regulations. For
example, ne~ section 275 erects an absolute entry barrier; neither
BOCs nor their affiliates may offer alarm monitoring services in the
next five years. 110 The same section also imposes a flat ban on granting
rival alarm services inferior interconnection111 and on cross-subsidizing
BOC alarm services from telephone exchange operations. 112
New section 274 forbids BOCs to offer electronic publishing except
through a separate affiliated entity or a joint venture, 113 but this separate-subsidiary requirement sunsets after four years. 114 New section 272
also imposes a separate affiliate requirement on BOC manufacturing of
equipment or provision of long distance services, m but imposes a different sunset rule! 16 (Previously, the FCC had determined that the separate subsidiary requirement was not a sound policy because it needlessly sacrificed economies of scale and scope, 117 but Congress determined
otherwise in the new Act)
Most dramatically, BOCs may not offer long distance services118 or
manufacture telecommunications equipment119 until they have first been
certified by the FCC. To be certified for these purposes, a BOC must
demonstrate to the Commission that it meets the fourteen requirements
specified in a "competitive checklist'' established by new section
271 (c)(2)(B). 120 Most of these conditions relate to the interconnection
obligations, detailed above, that other provisions of the Act impose on
each incumbent LEC. For example, the BOC must show that it is providing or has offered to provide nondiscriminatory access to its poles, 121
number portability, 122 and unbundled services. 123 In short, the BOCs'
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 275(a)(1).
Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 275(b)(1).
Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 275(b)(2).
Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 274(b).
Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 274(g)(2).
Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 272(a)(2).
/d. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 272(f)(1).
1LP, supra note 6, at 554-58 (citing California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(b)(I).
/d. § 15I(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 273(a).
Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B).
Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii).
/d. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi).
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ability to offer long distance services and to manufacture equipment is
conditioned on their meeting their new open interconnection responsibilities; in turn, if BOCs meet these responsibilities, true competition in
the market(s) for local exchange services may become feasible.
Further, before the FCC authorizes a BOC to offer long distance
services, the agency must ask the Attorney General for an opinion. 124
What, if any, weight the Commission must give to the Attorney
General's opinion is not specified. A BOC that manufactures and sells
equipment must also disclose vast quantities of information about its
protocols, technical requirements, and network configuration. 125 The goal
of these provisions is to prevent the BOC from using inside information
gained in its role as a local exchange service to become the sole supplier of equipment to operate that service.
In sum, it is difficult to imagine a regulatory strategy, other than a
permanent complete ban on entry into allied markets, 126 for coping with
the possibility of predatory cross-subsidization and discriminatory interconnection by Bell operating companies that is not employed, at one
point or another, in the 1996 Act. The new Act does abandon the
MFJ's premise that the newly created BOCs should be strictly confined
to offering regulated plain vanilla local exchange service. But the Act
does not permit unrestricted entry into other markets or deny the MFJ's
premise that the BOCs, if not regulated, will likely unfairly monopolize
allied markets. Rather, the 1996 Act expresses a preference for seeking
the benefits of competition in these markets, by letting the BOCs in,
while strictly overseeing these carriers' behavior so that BOC entry
does not perversely retard competition. (These provisions of the new
Act apply only to those local exchange carriers that are former Bell
companies.)
c. Universal Service
"Universal service" has been an articulated goal of telephone regulation at least since the 1960's. 127 What it means, however, has never

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

/d. § 15l{a), adding 41
/d. § 15l{a), adding 41
/d. § l5l(a), adding 41
Recall that this was the
Mueller, supra note 17,

U.S.C. 27l(c)(2)(B}(vi).
U.S.C. § 27l(d)(2)(A).
U.S.C. § 273(c).
principal regulatory strategy employed in the consent decree.
at 355.

1996]

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996

143

been clear, although the concept has always been tied, in some fashion,
to the presence of internal cross-subsidies in the pricing of phone service and has been limited to the subsidized pricing of basic voice-grade
dial tone.
For example, 128 to some, "universal service" means that a telephone
line should be available to every U.S. residence at an average, roughly
standardized, cost. Principally, this entails pricing basic phone service to
outlying rural areas below the costs of that service. 129 To others, "universal service" means keeping the costs of basic dial tone service to
residences as low as is feasible. Principally, that has entailed charging
higher rates to businesses than to residences for equivalent phone service. To yet others, "universal service" means charging lower rates to
people with lower incomes. One method of pursuing this goal at the
national level has been to price long-distance service substantially above
its costs, so that residential rates could be subsidized by the override.
(Lower income people make fewer long distance calls than higher income people.)
Until the 1996 Act was passed, no statutory codification of the
principle of universal service existed. Now we have new Section 254 of
old Title IT. 130 It requires the Commission to set up a federal-state joint
board ("Joint Board") to implement the universal service goal. 131
What is "universal service" now? Well, it is everything. Certainly,
it is no longer restricted to providing simple basic voice-grade dial tone
to favored classes. One key provision states that the Joint Board and
the Commission are to observe this principle:
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas,
should have access to telecommunications and information services, including interexchange [i.e., long distance] services and
advanced telecommunications and information services, that are
reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas

128. Most of the examples in this paragraph arc discussed in 11.P, Sllpra nole 6, nt 467-68.
129. If the point is not intuitively obvious, suppose it costs S100 to string a aelephone line
one mile. Such a line might service one million people in Chicago, but only len pi:Ople in the
rural parts of Montana. If the latter arc to receive phone service nt the national average cost
per home of stringing a wire to the home, then rural Montnna residents Y.ill pay less than the
costs of stringing a wire to them.
130. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 254.
131. Id. § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).
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and that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to
rates charged for similar services in urban areas. 132

Nothing seems to be left out of this list. Universal service encompasses
below cost treatment on the basis of income, geography, and quality of
service. Nor is the subsidy limited to basic voice-grade dial tone service.
But wait; there's more. Another key provision states that
"[u]niversal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services
that the Commission shall establish periodically . . . taking into account
advances in telecommunications and information technologies and services. . . . " 133 Further, universal service includes the principle that
"[e]lementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care providers, and libraries should have access to advanced telecommunications
services ...." 134 Both the "universal" and the "service" aspects of
"universal service" will grow over time.
How will these universal service goals be achieved? By giving
universal service support, for specific universal service purposes, to
telecommunications carriers. 135 Whence the money? The Commission
and the Joint Board will place a tax 136 on telephone operators. "All
providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable and
nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement of
universal service." 137 In particular, "[e]very telecommunications carrier
that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on
an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis . . . :ms
Universal service is now an explicitly articulated goal of telecommunications regulation. It is to be achieved by levying a proportionate
tax on all telecommunications service providers, which should make
more visible both the nature and amounts of the cross-subsidies encompassed within the universal service program. Several classes of custom-

132. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3).
133. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1).
134. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6).
135. Jd § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(e).
136. I beg every Representative and Senator who voted for this bill, and the President who
signed it, to forgive me for calling this thing by its correct name. The new Act, of course,
does not employ the "T word."
137. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(4).
138. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
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ers are to be protected by the universal service policy. Exactly what
services will be encompassed within the concept of universal service remains quite unclear, however, because no specific or fixed meaning
may be ascribed to the list of items that make up "universal service"; it
is an "evolving level" of services to be established "periodically' by
the FCC, 139 not just a basic dial tone.
B. Content Controls
Government cannot effectively control the content of the electronic
mass media in this country. 140 When it tries to do so, it inevitably acts
to advantage privileged speech and to penalize that which is unpopular
and out of fashion. 141 At times, the FCC has appeared to grasp the
truth of these virtually self-evident propositions. 142 But neither the Senate nor the House has ever been able to resist for long the temptation
to try to make radio and television "better" 143 and the Supreme Court
seems to delight in cheering on their efforts to do so. 144
In the 1960's the hot button topics were media access and drug use
among the cultured elite (i.e., children of Senators, Representatives, and
Commissioners). So we got the fairness doctrine, cable access channels
and bans on playing songs that "promoted" or "glorified" drug use. 145
Today, the hot button issues are the virulent corruption of young
people's morals by the sounds of profanity and the sight of human
genitals and the brutalizing, dehumanization of our youth by permitting
them to watch simulated violence.
So, Congress added to the 1996 Act a variety of censorship regulations designed to turn the Internet into a souped-up version of lvfy
Weekly Reader and to return broadcast and cable television to the glory
years of Amos 'n' Andy. These new regulations are embedded in Title
V of the new Act, which is called the "Communications Decency Act

139. /d. § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 254(c)(l).
140. RBP, supra note 6, passim.
141. /d. a1 chs. 4, S & 9.
142. See, e.g., TI.P, supra note 6, al 149-52 & 188-94.
143. Consider, for example, Congress' repeated efforts to legislate on "indecent" bro::!dcasting.
described id. a1 176-78.
144. RBP, supra note 6, a1 175-202.
145. See generally id. al chs. 4 & 5.
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of 1996" ("CDA"). 146
1. Internet

The key provision here is section 502 of the new Act, 147 entitled
"Obscene or Harassing use of Telecommunications Facilities Under the
Communications Act of 1934," which is reprinted at the end of this
article. The section is, to say the least, somewhat opaque. People are
already arguing about its meaning and these arguments will persist
through at least several court challenges. 148 The central part of section
502 makes it a crime to:
useD an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age; or [to] useD any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age, any comment . . . image, or
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication. 149
Literally, these provisions would appear to criminalize transmission
over the Internet (or any other pathway to a personal computer accessible to anyone under 18)150 of countless novels, poems, photographs or
motion pictures. Adults appear to be required to converse, through their
interactive computers, in language fit for nine-year-olds.
But with a statute like this, literalness may not get us very far.
After all, the Communications Decency Act literally distinguishes between "an interactive computer service" and "any interactive computer
service."ISI The Act also provides some defenses that suggest that the
146. Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§ 501-561.
147. /d. § 502, amending and adding to 41 U.S.C. § 233.
148. As this article was written, a three-judge federal district court held the Act unconstitutionally vague and an impennissible intrusion into the First Amendment rights of adults. See
ACLU v. Reno, Nos. CIV.A.96-963, 96-1458, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7919, at •86 (E.D. Pa.
June 12, 1996). The Justice Department has filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. See
also Randall Mikkelsen, Internet Indecency Ruling Appealed to U.S. Supreme Court, REuTERS
N.AM. WIRE, July 2, 1996; Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 561(b).
149. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. §§ 223(d)(1)(A)&(B).
150. Anywhere in the world?
151. Compare Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(A)
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merely passive act of transmitting what someone else has posted does
not violate the Act. 152 Further, the Act is quite silent - perhaps deliberately so- with respect to the kind of intent (or, mens rea) necessary
to make the behavior criminal. Must a message transmitter intend that a
specific underage person receive the communication? Nor does the Act
address the question of what knowledge (or, scienter) the sender must
have. Presumably, the sender must be aware of the contents of the
message; 153 must slhe also be aware that the message is "patently offensive"? And whose "community standards" provide the guideposts for
this inquiry into offensiveness? Nor does the Act address the issue of
extraterritoriality: does Congress mean to punish someone sitting in
Estonia who posts a picture of a naked person on his home computer
bulletin board that could be accessed by an enterprising U.S. teenager?Is4
All these questions ask, in part, what Congress meant. To the extent that anyone can talk about the "intention" of a corporate body, we
can say only that Congress meant to get (many or most) discussions or
pictures of sexual activities or organs off the Internet. To the ex1ent
that we have any memory of censorship efforts in this country, we
know that this is a futile task, doomed to failure - but, perhaps a few
pitiable folks will be sent to prison in the effort. 155
Somewhat more helpfully, the Communications Decency Act also
contains section 509, entitled "Online Family Empowennent."156 This
adds a new section 230 to Title II of the 1934 Act, which is to be
entitled "Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive
Material." 157 The new section essentially immunizes from liability any
"provider or user of an interactive computer service" who restricts "access to or [the] availability of' indecent material or helps others gain

with § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 223(d)(l)(B).
152. Id. § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 223(e)(1).
153. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 156 (1959).
154. The editors of this journal infonn me that this ruticle may be made available. in electronic form, to computer tenninals here and abroad. Accordingly, I wish to say for the record
that I assume that anyone reading this article - at least in electronic fonn - is, in fact, fully
clothed while doing so. It is certainly not my intention to suggest, much less to inciie. coed
naked law review reading.
155. It is, I think, no accident that it was Blutarsky, the Quasimodo of "Animal House." who
responded to the classic battle cry, "This situation absolutely requires n renlly futile and stupid
gesture be done on somebody's part!," with the immortal cluuge. "We're just the guys to do
it!" who was subsequently elected to the U.S. Senlltc.
156. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, adding 41 U.S.C. § 230.
157. /d. § 509, adding 41
§ 230.

u.s.c.
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the technical means to do so. 158 Without such a provision, a person or
firm operating as a common carrier might have been liable for failure
to transmit "indecent" material. As an ordinary rule, common carriers
are not expected or permitted to censor the contents of communications
they carry. 159 Because this section apparently simply facilitates the creation of "indecency-free safe harbors" for those who desire them, this
may be regarded as a helpful measure that may affirmatively assist
people in the exercise of their constitutional rights to choose what they
read, see or hear. 160
2. Cable
The Communications Decency Act contains a few measures designed to reduce the amount of nudity on cable television. Section 505
of the new Act tells cable operators that they must scramble the signal
of "any channel of its service primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented
programming." 161 Section 506 tells operators that they can refuse to
transmit any public access or leased access program ''which contains
obscenity, indecency or nudity." 162 Most interesting in this regard is
Section 504: "Upon request by a cable service subscriber, a cable operator shall, without charge, fully scramble or otherwise fully block the
audio and video programming of each channel carrying such programming so that one not a subscriber does not receive it." 163 No definition
of "such programming" is provided, nor is any reference back apparent.
Can this mean that any single subscriber can force an operator to
scramble the signal for any channel, without regard to whether the

158. /d. § 509, adding 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
159. See Michael I. Myerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Ca"iers: Identifying the
"Speaker" Within the New Media, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 114-15, 121-22 (1995).
160. For a good description of the boundaries of this protected right, see Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
161. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 641(a).
162. /d. § 506, amending 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) and§ 532(c)(2). The extension to non-indecent
nudity is interesting, but what this is supposed to mean escapes me entirely. To "contain[ )
nudity" must the program depict a completely nude person, portrayed as such from all sides
and angles? If not, may the operator censor a program that depicts a baby being diapered? Or
a teen-age girl not wearing shoes? One might say that "nudity" in this context must mean
"erotic nudity." But, of course, there are pedophiles out there. And some people do have foot
fetishes. In any event, we are talking here about nudity that is neither obscene nor indecent,
according to the statutory text
163. /d. § 504, adding 47 U.S.C. § 640(a).
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channel carries sex or violence?
Note that Congress structured each of these sections so as not to
engage in strict censorship. Operators are only told to scramble certain
channels or pennitted to decline to cany certain programs. The first
tactic nevertheless risks invalidation because of its selectivity. Why are
only sexually-oriented programs to be scrambled? The second tactic will
test the bounds of the Supreme Court's recent decision invalidating a
statute that required cable operators to segregate indecent programs on
certain channels. 164

3. The V-chip
Section 551 of the new Act is entitled "Parental Choice in Television Programming." 165 The section contains Congressional findings that
children are harmed by exposure to violent video programming166 and
to pervasive and casual treatment of sexual material. 167 Further, "[t]here
is a compelling governmental interest in empowering parents to limit
the negative influences of video programming that is harmful to children."168 Based on these findings, section 551 attempts to facilitate
private, parental screening and blocking of sexual or violent programming.
Accordingly, the Act directs the Commission to establish ways to
identify and rate ''video programming that contains sexual, violent, or
other indecent material about which parents should be infonned before
it is displayed to children." 169 To devise this ratings system, the FCC is
to employ an advisory committee. 170 These provisions, however, do not
become effective for one year. 171 Indeed, they do not become effective

164. See Denver Area Educ. Telecoms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 95-124, 95-227, 1996
U.S. LEXIS 4261 (June 28, 1996).
165. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 551, adding 41 U.S.C. § 303.
166. Jd. § 5S1(a)(4), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(4).
167. Jd. § SS1(a)(6), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(6).
168. Jd. § 5S1(a)(8), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(8).
169. Id. § 551(b)(1), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(w)(1). Civil libenarinns v.-atch out! The notion
that "indecency" encompasses more than "sexual" program mtlterial (unless meant only as a
more polite way of incorporating depictions of excretion) is quite new to the law. What is this
"other indecent material" that is neither violent nor sexual in nature, content or theme? See
also note 162.
170. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 5S1(b)(1 & 2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2).
171. /d. § 5S1(e)(1), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(1).
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at all if the distributors of video programming have "established voluntary [rating] rules" 172 and "agreed voluntarily to broadcast signals that
contain ratings of such programming." 173
In short, through section 551, Congress calls on the industry to
adopt a uniform rating code. That "request" is backed up by the direction to the Commission to do the job itself if the industry fails to do
it. Not surprisingly, the television industry fears the outcome of an
FCC-initiated process. Shortly after passage of the new Act, an industry
committee was formed which is expected to devise and implement a
ratings system. 174
What will be done with these ratings? First, as noted, they will be
embedded in the signal broadcasters (and cablecasters) transmit. Then
they can be scanned by television sets. The Act also directs the Commission to regulate television set manufacture so that in the future television sets are "equipped with a feature designed to enable viewers to
block display of all programs with a common rating." 175 In short, the
ratings code will be inserted into broadcast signals, where it will be
"read" by a feature added to the decoder on these new television sets.
If the new feature (in political parlance, a "V-chip"176) is activated by
the set owner, the feature will block reception of encoded signals. 177

C. Overview

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to a large extent a grabbag, a pastiche of provisions aimed at a variety of real or imagined
ills. One might say that the only thing all these provisions have in
common is that they reform the law the FCC applies.
That would be too simple, of course. Recall that at the outset, I
suggested the Act might also be characterized principally as a legisla-

172. !d. § 551(e)(1)(A), adding 47 U.S.C. § 303(e)(1)(A).
173. Id § 551(e)(1)(B), adding 47 U.S.C. § 303(e)(1)(B).
174. See generally Media Notes: TV Ratings Group Formed, MEDIA DAILY, Mar. 14, 1996,
at no. 5, vol. 4, available in LEXIS, Newsletter Database. See also Paul Farhi, TV Execs Deliver Rating Plan to White House, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1996, at Dl.
175. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 551(c), adding 47 U.S.C. 303(x).
176. The "V" is for "violence."
177. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 204(b), adding 47 U.S.C. 308(d} also requires all
television licensees to keep and make public all complaints they receive concerning violent
programming on their stations.
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tive response to the twin features of technological convergence and
legal balkanization. Also, the censorship features of the Act, while
interesting and important, are by no means its dominant features.
Because the Act deals with so many diverse subjects, an evaluation
of it must be also somewhat piecemeal. Nevertheless, I attempt some
interconnected criticisms in what follows.

ill. EVALUATION

What are we to make of this complicated new Act? In part, one's
judgment will be influenced by which provisions one cares about. To
take an easy example, the owner of a radio station will find almost
nothing to dislike in this Act, while the removal of group ownership
caps is quite likely to increase the station's value. Count the AMIFM
radio licensees as supporters.
More critically, one's judgment depends on the values one brings to
evaluation of telecommunications regulation generally. For an obvious
example, consider a person who is comfortable with the post-World
War ll British model, in which the government owns and operates all
the facilities of telecommunications and programs its airwaves. I suspect
this person would find little to applaud in the interconnection provisions
of the new Act but would presumably not be fazed by the regulation of
"indecent'' telecommunications.
Personally, I do not like the old British model. It does not comport
at all with our notions of freedom of speech and our reliance on market mechanisms to appraise and allocate goods and resources. By what
criteria do I suggest we ought to judge regulation of the electronic
media? Writing at the time only about broadcast regulation, 178 Lucas
Powe and I spelled out criteria that we would employ and which I am
satisfied would make admirable baselines for all mass media regulation.
(Indeed, we argued that a very compelling reason for adopting our criteria was that, in this country, citizens and scholars of virtually all
political persuasions adhere steadfastly to these standards when judging
the regulation of non-electronic mass media.)
In brie/, 119 we advance four criteria for measuring whether telecom-

178. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powc:, Jr., Com-erging rust Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE W. 1719, 1726-32 (1995).
179. See id. (for details of the arguments set out in this parograph).
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munications regulation serves truly public (not private) interest goals:
(1) Editorial control over what is said and how it is said should be
lodged in private, not governmental, institutions. (2) Government has an
important role to play in fostering access by speakers to mass media.
For purposes of this criterion, "access" means the ability to reach any
willing recipient by any speaker willing to pay the economic costs 180 of
doing so (and does not mean that government must or should require
others to subsidize the would-be communicator). (3) Government policies should foster diversity in the media marketplace. Diversity is
achieved when people are allowed to bid for any information or entertainment they desire and to receive what they seek, so long as they are
willing to pay the economic costs of receiving it. (4) Government may
not sacrifice any of the three foregoing principles to further goals associated with either or both of the others. Where such sacrifice is not entailed, however, government may extend the goals associated with any
of these principles. Put somewhat less formally, these criteria suggest
that we should evaluate government regulation of any medium of mass
communications by whether it avoids content controls, reduces entry
barriers, prevents anticompetitive behavior, and facilitates technological
progress.
Using those criteria, I judge the Telecommunications Act of 1996
to be a mixed blessing. It seems to me that some of its features are
good, others bad, and some plain ugly. 181
A. The Good

1. Broadcasting
It seems to me that, by the criteria I urge, three aspects of the new
rules regarding broadcasting, both radio and television, are indisputably
"good." First, the removal or loosening of limits on the number of
stations group owners may control should increase competition. Efficient firms should now be freer to purchase inefficient ones. Costs of

I 80. By "economic costs," I mean the costs (including opportunity costs) of resources em·
ployed in communicating, not necessarily the prices charged by (perhaps monopolistic) owners
of those resources.
181. The attempted invocation here of the motion picture "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly"
is deliberate. I find that movie complicated, dull, boring, and unintelligible. So would any Eng·
!ish speaking person, not trained in telecommunications law or practice, who reads the new Act
Accordingly, I think it is quite fair to ask (as did one of my students) of those of us who do
find the new Act interesting (and somewhat readable) whether we need to "get a life."
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access should go down.
I would not rate this as a very large plus. After all, station buyers
other than existing group owners have always been available to purchase less efficient stations. Nor does there seem to be a shortage of
managerial talent in the industry that would suggest that only group
own_ers are efficient acquirors. Nevertheless, removing this artificial
barrier to the market for trading in station licenses ought to make the
broadcast industry more efficient
The second and third "good" provisions operate in tandem. By both
extending the broadcast station license term and ending the comparative
renewal proceeding, the Act should greatly lower the regulatory costs
of doing business as a broadcaster. Those lower costs ought to translate
into more stations on the air, operating at (and therefore providing
access at) lower rates.
Further, now that radio licenses are essentially perpetual, licensees
should also be able to make, at lower cost, better long-term investments
in programming and talent. Until these revisions, broadcasters had to
rely on the FCC and reviewing courts agreeing that they were entitled
to a "renewal expectancy" to justify renewing their licenses. 182 Now,
station owners can show lenders and investors that, so long as they
abide by the rules, they have a statutory right to a renewal (and for a
longer term).
2. Cable
Two features of the Act regarding cable seem to me probably good.
a. Partial Repeal of Rate Regulation 183

I applaud the removal of rate regulation from the "cable tier." This
is because I think that the principal effect of cable rate regulation to
date has been to degrade the cable plant Let me say immediately that I
do not know how to prove or disprove that assertion. Now, let me
explain why I believe it nevertheless.
When the Commission imposed rate regulation (at Congress's direc-

182. See 1LP, supra note 6, at lOS-IS.
183. The data provided in this discussion is taken from ld. at 442-60.
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tive), it chose not to employ traditional rate of return regulation, in
which the agency monitors all costs and chooses an acceptable additional rate of return. Today, most observers agree that such regulation is
more costly than any good it produces. Rather, the Commission chose
to impose "price caps" on cable systems. Under this method, the FCC
sets a limit on ("caps") the regulated (cable) firm's prices. The firm is
then free to lower prices as much as it wishes.
A principal asserted advantage of the price caps approach is that
this method gives price regulated firms an incentive to become more
efficient, an incentive denied them by rate of return regulation, which
(in theory) would lower permissible prices as soon as costs were lowered. It is true that price caps increase the incentive to be more efficient. That is because they increase the incentive to cut costs. Another
way to cut costs is to let the system go to seed. Price caps also make
it next to impossible to increase costs in order to increase quality of
service.
Thus, the imposition of price caps on cable systems rendered them
almost powerless to increase consumer satisfaction by offering subscribers better quality, albeit at higher cost. 184 So, it appears, the nation's
cable plant has just sat there, gathering moss, since the imposition of
price caps. To keep profits up, cable systems had the further option
actually to let their systems begin to rot. Whether they did, or will, do
this only time will tell.
This begrudging partial removal, in three years, of some cable rate
regulation ought to offer some possibility for new investment in the
cable infrastructure. Meanwhile, competition from even more recent
technologies, like direct broadcast satellites, video rentals, and other
local entertainment sources, ought to constrain the prices for the "cable
network" tier.
b. Dropping the Telco Ban
The repeal of the prohibition on telephone companies (telcos) offer-

184. Belatedly, the FCC realized this problem and began to offer "upgrade incentives." These
permitted cable operators to add channels and recover their costs so long as prices were kept
down on existing channels. This provided little aid, of course, to systems that might wish to
upgrade by offering better physical connections. And it essentially simply substituted rate of
return regulation, a method whose ineffectiveness had supposedly led to the preference for price
caps!
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ing cable services is also commendable, at least in theory. The FCC's
''video dial tone" rules already pennitted telcos to offer a pure common
carrier cable service in their telephone service area, 185 but the new Act
pennits greater vertical integration of programming and pipeline in a
telco cable system. This may enable the telcos to diversify their risk
and, thus, to invest more; it certainly offers them the opportunity to
create a cable system '~ust like that'' already offered by competing
cable firms. If providing cable television service is to become a competitive market, this may occur in many ways, but surely one of the
most likely is by the entry, in many local markets, of the local phone
company.

3. Telephony
On balance, I think it was the better part of wisdom to unleash the
Baby Bells, pennitting them to enter long distance and manufacturing
markets, and to open up the local exchange carriers to interconnection
and access so that competitive LECs might arise. Certainly, these approaches follow the path we usually prefer of pursuing the goals of
access and diversity by fostering open competitive markets.
One should not let this point pass, however, without noticing that
there is another side. Phrased as a smorgasbord of acronyms, perhaps
the LECs and BOCs should have been confined to POTS ("plain old
telephone service"). In longer and plainer tenns, maybe it would be
better to pennit monopoly firms (or monopoly government agencies) to
superintend the infrastructure, while others (excluding the monopoly
firms) operate services provided through and upon that infrastructure.
This is somewhat analogous to the way we run the highway transportation system. Government builds and operates the roads (infrastructure)
but leaves the provision of transportation services (cars, buses, trucks
on the highways) to the private sector.
Perhaps, due to economies of scale and scope, it is cheaper to have
just one telecommunications wire going into each and every home. If
so, it might be wise to let one firm build and operate those wires (and
their attendant switches and interconnection points) without being able
to sell services to businesses and consumers (i.e., without having the
ability to prey in allied markets). Indeed, one might say that such a

185. TLP, supra note 6, at 567-87.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

156

[Vol. 29:123

policy - which we might describe by the slogan "Let the BOCs do
POTS" - was the central feature of the consent decree that dissolved
AT&T and created these BOCs. 186
I reject this wishful thinking because I believe it is insufficiently
sensitive to the dynamism of telecommunications technologies. How
could we define "POTS" today in a manner that we thought would be
intelligible ten years from now? Would these infrastructure providers
also have to provide the mobile telephone services that are growing
today? Would we include airplane-to-ground telephones in the LECs'
protected zone? Is "call waiting" or "call forwarding" plain old telephone service or an enhanced service?
In 1956 AT&T signed an antitrust consent decree in which it
agreed to confine its services to regulated telecommunications offerings. 187 Two decades later, everyone was squabbling over whether this
meant AT&T could operate and sell services for interactive computers. 188 I think an attempt to impose a legal straitjacket on the local
exchange carriers would fail similarly.
In short, given the constantly evolving technologies of mass telephonic communication, I believe we will just have to live with competition in this area, like it or not. How to induce and oversee that
competition is discussed below.
4. Summary
Particularly in light of the more negative commentary that follows,
I should say that what is good about the Telecommunications Act of
1996 is quite good indeed. It seeks to end monopolization and
balkanization, especially of cable and wired telephone markets, by
breaking down entry barriers. Whether, to what extent, and in what
form telecommunications technologies will converge ought to be decided, then, by the free interactions of producers and consumers in marketplaces rather than by five FCC commissioners construing a sixtyyear-old statute. Put in terms of the criteria set forth above, access and
diversity should increase, while the increasingly evident powers that
consumers exercise over the media should reduce public pressures for
censorship.

186. /d. at 491-514.
187. /d. at 480.
188. /d. at 479-81.
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B. The Bad
In my view, most of the main features of the new Act contain
"bad" features along with the "good." Candidly, one might describe
these not as "bad" features of the Act, but as reasons not to be too
optimistic about the good parts. I, however, call these "bad" parts of
the Act because of the foregone opportunities to achieve real reform
that they represent.

1. Broadcasting
The new Act does very little to reform broadcasting law and policy
in helpful ways. Censorship is not repealed, but rather is extended. The
horrors of spectrum allocation for television are not ameliorated, but
compounded. 189 The extended license terms and abolition of the comparative renewal hearing will have modest practical consequences because, in practice, licensees who do not flout the FCC or its rules always get their licenses renewed. 190
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was supposed to pull together
the major needs and ideas for reform in this area of the law. With
respect to broadcasting, however, the Act is just a series of missed
opportunities. Congress gave the broadcasters some money by increasing the value of their licenses. Viewers and listeners may perhaps benefit from a slightly more competitive and slightly less costly system.
Those of us who do not own stations could have done a lot better had
Congress seriously considered reform, in the public interest, of broadcasting law and policy. I discuss in subsequent sections of this Article
what I believe some of those reforms would entail.

2. Cable
Here, too, I believe Congress labored mightily and brought forth a
mouse. There is, I think, some - but not much - reason to believe
that cable can be provided competitively. Probably, it is a natural monopoly.191 So consumers are unlikely to be able to protect themselves
by switching to another cable company in their neighborhood. This
means that, at least in the long run, subscribers are most likely to seek,

189. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§ 201-207.
190. lLP, supra note 6, at 105-20.
191. For a discussion of the concept of a "natural monopoly" and its application to cable TV
and to providing telephone service see id. at 331-32.
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and perhaps obtain, protection from the monopoly ills of cable in three
other ways.
First, and most importantly, cable is likely to encounter direct competition from other multi-video program distributors ("MVPDs'') using
other technologies, such as direct broadcast satellites and multichannel
multipoint distribution service ("MMDS"), to which cable subscribers
can easily switch. Second, to the extent that cable remains a natural
monopoly, cable service providers are likely to want to discriminate in
the prices they charge, for example by offering cheap alternatives to the
poor and more expensive ones to the wealthy. Such discrimination
would still leave monopolist cable services with unjustifiably high incomes, but would also at least expand options available to all while
providing some protection for low income consumers. Finally, modest
leased access provisions - say, a requirement that five to ten percent
of channel capacity be set aside for programmers' access to cable systems on a common carrier basis - is likely to protect against the
chance that a cable monopolist would cause real harm to viewers' welfare by selecting programs on the basis of ideological bias or by engaging in gross price discrimination.
If these arguments are correct, then letting telcos into cable will be,
in the long run, of little consequence. 192 It would be more important,
by far, to focus on establishing other MVPDs as viable competitors and
strengthening and clarifying leased access rules. Further, the merely
partial relaxation of rate regulation, to occur three years hence, does
not seriously address the issue whether cable systems ought to be freed
to compete, with other MVPDs and with other sources of information
and entertainment, on the basis of quality of service offered.
3. Telephony
a. Everyone into LECs
What I have just said about the natural monopoly aspects of cable
television 193 applies equally to the attempts to spur facilities-based competition in the local loop. It is most likely that running a telecommuni-

192.
tional
could
193.

However, if lelephone companies can operale cable syslems more cheaply than convencable operators, then consumers will receive a long lerm benefit from lelco entry that
be quile substantial.
See supra lext accompanying noles 191-92; see also supra nole 6 at 331.
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cations wire to the home is a natural monopoly and so one ought to
concentrate on regulating that monopoly or mitigating its ill effects.
To some extent, the new Act accomplishes this. By placing e,..1ensive interconnection requirements on incumbent LECs, the 1996 Act
creates a new vision of competition at the local loop level. In this
vision, one firm may superintend the wires and switches that make up
the local loop while that firm competes with others to sell exchange
services, including the basic dial tone, to customers.
The difficulty, I believe, with this aspect of the Act is not its vision, but its execution. The interconnection sections impose so many
restrictions, and direct the Commission to write so many rules, 194 that
one must fear that the regulatory costs of this open access regime will
exceed its payoff in reduced rates or improved service quality.
At the same time, the new Act does little to expand the competitive
opportunities of the most likely competitors to incumbent LECs, the
wireless phone (and other) services providers. Mobile, cellular telephony
is now a rather mature technology employed by a large industry. ''Personal communications services" (''PCS") - which utilize even smaller
devices that can carry even more data - are squarely on the horizon.
The 1996 Act misses opportunities to make wireless a more robust
competitor. LECs are still permitted to own wireless phone operations
in their service area. The Act does not clearly grant wireless phone
providers a federally protected right to interconnection with LECs at
real economic costs. 195 The rules for auctioning off the spectrum that
PCS uses are still loaded with special rules for special groups 196 so that
the spectrum is less likely to be used efficiently, while the auctions
provide modest "welfare" benefits to small businesses.
Two cheers, then, for the local loop interconnection aspects of the
1996 Act. One can hope that a subsequent Congress will return to this
important topic and strip many of the interconnection regulations away
while acting further to foster wireless as a competitive alternative.

194. See, e.g., In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, 1996 FCC LEXIS 2063 (Apr. 19, 1996).
195. Some states have read § 252, added to the new Act, to commit this issue to the state
regulatory commissions. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. §
252. I disagree with this view. I wish to note further that I have expressed this view, nt the
behest of a private client, to responsible persons at the FCC.
196. See Jon Van, High-Tech Bel: Cellular's Success Makes New Technology Seem a Surer
Thing, em. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1994, at 1, zone C.
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b. BOCs into Everything
In a preceding section, I explained why I believe it is unwise and
infeasible to try to impose line of business restrictions on local exchange carriers. With respect to those LECs that are not Bell operating
companies, we have had no such restrictions for some time now. None
of these LECs appears to have monopolized long distance or alarm
services markets. Consequently, I believe one must applaud those features of the new bill that admit the BOCs into the long distance services, equipment manufacturing, electronic publishing, and alarm monitoring services markets.
But there is a "bad" side to this "good" reform as well. Recall the
numerous regulations with which the new Act surrounds any BOC
wishing to enter these markets. 197 To enter the long distance market, for
example, a BOC must not only employ a separate subsidiary, 198 but it
must also show that it is now confronting (or has done all it can to
bring about) facilities based competition in its local loop services. 199 At
the same time, because the theory underlying the MFJ has now become
part of the standard wisdom of antitrust law, the BOC remains constrained by the Sherman Act from engaging in discriminatory interconnection or predatory cross subsidization.200 Meanwhile, the imposition of
price caps instead of rate of return regulation makes a predatory cross
subsidy strategy impractical in any event.201
And what is the point of these countless regulations? To keep the
BOC from preying against AT&T! The theory of the MFJ is now being used to protect AT&T. Is this because we need to protect AT&T
from a new monolithic monster? No, these redundant provisions shelter
AT&T from seven distinct, uncoordinated firms who will presumably
have to compete against each other in the long distance market, as well
as against AT&T, Sprint, MCI, and others.
Simply put, the case for this kind of extensive, overlapping regulation has not been made and probably cannot be made. A BOC is not
AT&T. BOC entry into long distance or equipment manufacturing arm
does not threaten AT&T in the same way that AT&T's long distance

197.
198.
199.
200.
20 I.

See supra text accompanying notes 103-26.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)(2)(B).
/d. § 151(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A).
TLP, supra note 6, at 491-526.
/d. at 532-41.
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operations threatened MCI or its equipment manufacturing threatened
Rolm. A BOC that wants to enter long distance or equipment manufacturing must face not only AT&T and its rivals, but other BOCs as
well, while its prices are capped and it operates in an antitrust climate
that now clearly sanctions the strategic anticompetitive behavior the
BOC might find profitable.2°2 If the BOCs are to be let in, I believe
they should be let in like everyone else.
C. The Ugly

The "good" features of the new Act, then, are clouded somewhat
by "bad" features that prevent this legislation from being as good as it
could be. Perhaps more significantly, the new Act contains several
"ugly'' features, each of which perpetuates and to some ex1ent magnifies some fundamentally flawed aspects of telecommunications law and
regulation.
Oversimplifying, we employ two methods to discipline privately
operated telecommunications firms so that they will serve the public
interest. One method is subjecting them to the oversight of an independent regulatory agency, the FCC. The other is subjecting these firms to
the rigors of marketplace competition, the oversight of consumers. The
new Act purports to shift the balance between these two methods decidedly in favor of reliance on consumer-driven market forces as disciplining agents. At the same time, however, the statute does nothing to
correct some very deep flaws in our policy of regulating telecommunications by competition.
1. The Problem of Spectrum Allocation
"The spectrum" is not tangible; it is nothing that someone can
possess. Rather what we call ''the spectrum" is a list of frequencies on
which we currently know how to transmit data through electronic sinusoidal waves.203 Like the chemist's Table of Periodic Elements, the
electrical engineer's spectrum has been a constantly growing list as

202. Of course, these arguments arc not convincing if the BOCs arc going to be pennitted to
merge among themselves to the point where only one or two or them remain.
203. /d. at 29-35.
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technology has evolved to pennit effective data transmission at higher
and lower ends of the spectrum.
The ability to transmit encoded data electronically on a particular
frequency, free from (a substantial amount of) interference, is a valuable resource. 204 I will call this resource "spectrum use." Spectrum use
is a resource in precisely the same way that transmitters, electrical
energy, microphones, and cameras are resources. Each of these goods,
when assembled in various combinations with other goods, pennits an
operator to create value, to perfonn a service for which people are
willing to pay.
Spectrum use differs from these other resources, however, in one
key respect. It is the sole resource used in telecommunications industries that has historically been given away without an explicit charge
for it. Broadcasters buy microphones, transmitters, electrical energy, and
so forth, but they are "given"205 spectrum use.
This government "gift policy" creates a huge competitive imbalance
between those who would transmit through the air and those who
would do so by wire. Congress has recognized this problem and ameliorated it a bit, in other legislation, by pennitting or requiring the FCC
to auction off spectrum for non-broadcast uses in the future. 206 Perversely, however, the newer 1996 Act seems oblivious to the problem.
For example, the true emerging competitors to cable appear to be
direct broadcast satellites ("DBS") and multichannel multipoint distribution service ("MMDS"). Yet most finns in these markets were given
free spectrum use while cable had to purchase its wire access. The true
emerging competitors for the local exchange carriers appear to be the
mobile, cellular industry. But this industry was given its spectrum in
large markets and acquired it via lottery in smaller ones. 207 The new
Act virtually directs the Commission to give free spectrum use to television broadcasters so that they may develop high definition television
("HDTV"). Why is cable not receiving a similar hand-out for the same
purpose?

204. /d. at 35-36.
205. Of course, one does not really get spectrum from the FCC without incurring any cost.
Rather, costs are incurred in different form, such as filing fees and legal fees, for those seeking licenses to use the spectrum. These costs, however, are unlikely to amount to the full value
of the spectrum use license, as Kwerel and Felker have demonstrated. See id. at 121-28 (c/1/ng
KWEREL & FELKER, USING AUcnONS TO SELECT FCC LICENSEES (1985)).
206. TLP, supra note 6, at 129.
207. /d. at 129-33.
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In all of these instances, we face the dilemma of trying to judge

the outcome of competitive markets when the game was rigged at the
outset. Suppose we decided to let competition dictate to what extent
people drank coffee or tea and what would be the relative prices of
each and then gave away coffee beans, but not tea leaves? The
new Act, supposedly designed to make markets work in telecommunications regulation, not only does nothing to create further markets in
spectrum, but it exacerbates some existing imbalances between wirebased and ether-based transmitting technologies.
Because we have no markets in spectrum use, we have had to
invent a method to create property rights in the spectrum. This has
been accomplished by allocating the rights to use the spectrum by administrative fiat. 208 Because the FCC has no prices for its spectrum use
rights, it has little idea how valuable one use is as compared to another. And, of course, the agency is susceptible to political pressures to
favor certain technologies or services over others.
For these reasons, administrative allocation of the electromagnetic
spectrum has not been a shining example of what regulation can do for
us. Nowhere is this more evident than in television broadcasting. There,
a series of FCC decisions in the 1950's essentially confined us, unnecessarily, to a closed entry, three commercial network system that persisted until the growth of cable made additional television broadcast
stations and therefore additional television networks profitable.209
To those with a detailed knowledge of the history of mis-allocation
and mis-assignment of the television spectrum, the grant to every existing television station of an additional channel for HDTV is an irony
that borders on the tragic. A one hundred percent increase in the
amount of spectrum allocated to commercial television broadcasting,
and not one single additional licensee! The new Act doubles the national resources committed to television, yet leaves the level of concen208. /d. at 36-38.
209. The story of this spectrum misallocation and its effects on the number of stations and
number and concentration of networks is laid out in summi!I)' form in MIV, supra note 6, at
12-20. A full version is in Thomas Schuessler, Structural Barr/en to the Entry of Additional
Television Networks: The Federal Communicalions Commission's Spectrum Management Policies,
54 S. CAL. L. REv. 875 (1981). Perhaps it is not immedintcly obvious why cable had an impact on television station viability. Briefly, cable improves (mdeed, virtually perfects) signal
quality to the home. Station assignments that were impractical due to the comparatively poor
signals they were authorized to transmit lost that handicap when cable was laid do\\ll in their
areas. Because the number of television networks is simply n function of the number ond geographical distribution of viable television stations, the growth of cable nlso helped fourth (Fox),
fifth (Paramount), and sixth (\Varner) television networks to nrisc.
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tration in this industry completely untouched! For decades, first the
FCC and subsequently the Congress bemoaned the virtual absence of
minority ownership210 - and vezy small participation of women - in
television broadcasting. Now, over 800 additional licenses are to be
handed out, without increasing the ratio of minority or female or small
business ownership one whit!
The acquisition by broadcasters of an additional license (apparently
at no charge), then, is more than a property rights grab without parallel
in the United States since the days of our previous robber barons, the
railroads. It is also an extraordinary denial of our professed commitments to increase competition, to lower entzy barriers and to expand
opportunities for historically excluded persons in the broadcasting industty. Ironically, it was pursuit of these commitments that was claimed to
justify failure to rely on simple market mechanisms to allocate the
broadcast spectrum.
Fortunately, the consequences of this extraordinary sell-out will not
be so dire. We now have cable. Cable networks and operators are free
to offer high definition television today. So are DBS, MMDS, and
videocassette entrepreneurs. More importantly, these technologies are
technologies of plenty; they expand opportunities for program suppliers
and open the television viewing markets to competition. Today, one
who does not enjoy the fare produced by an oligopoly can simply tune
out the conventional broadcasters.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the new Act does nothing to
redress a fundamental flaw in our competition policy in telecommunications: the competitive imbalance we create between wired and wireless
carriers. At the same time, it exacerbates a fundamental flaw in our
regulatory policy toward broadcasting: the use of spectrum allocation
authority to confer market power on a closed class of privileged broadcasters.
2. The Problem of Universal Service

Universal service, as defined in the new Act, and competitive markets cannot co-exist, where the goods produced have many substitutes
or where the technology is dynamic. We are so used to universal service in telephone markets that the point may be better illustrated from

210. /d. at 93-96.
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another perspective.
Suppose government decided to establish "universal housing" by
requiring that every third new house built be sold at twenty percent
below its cost. What would happen? The number of new homes built
would fall dramatically. Builders would need to price two of every
three new houses well above cost. Purchasers would shift to the "used
house" market (at least until they thereby drove prices in that market
up to a new balance with the "new house" market).
Similar shifting would occur with telecommunications. If you tell a
telephone company to provide basic residential phone service to low income neighborhoods or computer services to elementary schools at
below cost prices, it will have to charge above cost prices to someone
else. But that someone else will then just shift his or her purchases to
a supplier other than the regulated telephone company.
There are three ways around this dilemma. First, government could
subsidize the purchase directly, from general tax funds. That is what
we do for low income housing, but not for low income telephony, in
the U.S. We cannot escape the "universal housing'' tax by shifting our
purchases in the housing market. Second, government could give the
phone company a monopoly, so that the customers to whom it would
raise prices would have no where else to turn. That is what we used to
do for low income and rural telephony in the U.S., when AT&T operated a fairly complete monopoly in several product lines and so was
able to generate subsidies internally. (Indeed, the FCC knew this. It
tried to prevent courts from authorizing competition in long distance
precisely because AT&T, in its monopoly incarnation, could cross-subsidize pro-social goals.211 )
A third option, embraced by the new Act, is to levy an equivalent
charge on everyone in the industry and then use those funds to subsidize directly the provider of the pro-social service(s). Thus, the new
Act specifies that providers of interstate telecommunications services
will "contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis,"212 to a
fund that will be used to subsidize those who provide "universal service."213 An "equitable and nondiscriminatory" fee might be, for example, a one percent gross receipts ''tax." This is "equitable and nondiscriminatory" in the sense that it is competitively neutral - its collec211. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC [Execunet 1], 561 F.2d 36S (D.C. Cir. 1977), cerL
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
212. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2S4(d).
213. Id. § l01(a), adding 47 U.S.C. §§ 2S4(d) & (e).
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tion should not bias consumer choices toward one seller rather than
another.
But, of course, this tax will bias choices. First of all, non-telecommunications services will become relatively more attractive. It may be
less efficient, measured by the value of resources expended, to mail a
letter than to make a phone call. However, due to the ''telecommunications tax," it may be less expensive to write than to call. A sensible
consumer will choose the (personally) cheaper, but (societally) less
efficient altemative.214 We should note, however, that this is a problem
only to the extent that non-telecommunications information technologies
are nearly equivalent in costs to those data transmission services that
are subject to the tax.
More daunting than the problem of old technologies is the problem
of new ones. With the new Act in place, people will now have incentives to create and to purchase methods of data transmission that are
(a) not as efficient as existing telecommunications services but (b) not
subject to the tax. To revert to the "universal housing" example, a firm
might start selling newly constructed mobile homes and argue that they
were not "houses" as defined in the Universal Housing Act. MCI started a long distance telephone service, but called itself a "specialized
common carrier'' and so got to offer deals that AT&T could not. 215
Neither the· mobile home builder nor MCI would have to be more efficient to succeed. Because telecommunications technology is so dynamic,
it is difficult to conceive of a regulatory regime that treats every such
technology and every effective substitute for it on a competitively neutral basis.216
Candidly, it is hard to argue against the concept of universal service without sounding like someone who hates little children and people who dwell in rural areas. But the point is not that school children
or poor people or rural folk do not deserve or need subsidized access
to telephone services. Rather, the point is that we have already learned

214. Perhaps then, it was not incompetence but brilliance that led the drafters of the new Act
to define "telecommunications" to include the act of delivering a letter from its author to a

recipient? See supra note 4.
215. 1LP, supra note 6, at 477-78.
216. I am not trying to argue here that public interest regulation can never work. One might
note, for example, that requiring seat belts in automobiles imposes a "competitively neutral" tax
on auto makers. I agree and do not believe that this makes such a tax poor regulatory or
market strategy. Rather, I believe the history of telecommunications regulation shows that the
technology outruns the regulators and that, in these markets, the pro-social subsidies virtually
always become competitive handicaps.
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that we cannot give these benefits to them through a system of industry
generated internal cross-subsidies unless we dictate that that industry be
monopolized.
I have no doubt that incumbent LECs will argue against competitive entry on the grounds that such entry will retard the universal service goals of the Act They will frequently be right. One simply cannot
have unbundled services with nondiscriminatory access and a system of
subsidized universal service obligations existing side by side.
In my judgment, it is both bad competition policy and bad regulatory policy to try to achieve properly functioning competitive telecommunications markets while a regulator sees to it that these same markets generate subsidized pro-social benefits. Sadly, I suspect that many
people in Congress know these things, but voted for the bill anyway.
3. The Problem of Competition Analysis
An extensive, thoughtful literature on the economics of industrial
organization and behavior underlies current antitrust law. This literature
teaches us that, in order to analyze the effects on competition of the
behavior at issue, we should first define the market(s) in which the
firm(s) operate, then detennine who controls what finns in that market,
and then calculate the extent of concentration of control in that market.217 These might seem obvious and elementary principles. To any
student of antitrust they are quite simple and basic. Yet one who had
read only the Telecommunications Act of 1996 would think that Congress was completely unaware of this antitrust learning.
a. Defining Markets

Industrial organization economists and antitrust lawyers alike start
with markets. They know (or believe) that we employ competition to
discipline finns - to keep them from producing shoddy goods or restricting output to raise prices. A "market'' is the group of finns that,
with respect to any other particular finn, disciplines that finn, by
threatening to steal its customers if the finn produces shoddy goods or

217. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANmRUST POUCY:
llS PRAcnCE 2-17 (1994).
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to expand output if the finn tries to raise its price. Thus, to know the
competitive consequences of a merger or an agreement, we need to
know the market or markets within which finns that are parties to the
merger or agreement operate.
With respect to telecommunications finns, it is particularly important to distinguish between local and national markets. Conventional
telecommunications delivery services to the home operate mostly in
local markets. I believe it is safe to assert that no one ever moved
from New York to Chicago to get better television reception or cable
or telephone service. Thus, Chicago broadcasters do not discipline New
York broadcasters in the market for selling broadcasts to listeners and
viewers. 218
The new Act appears to recognize this principle when it removes
all national limits on radio station ownership. But it does not remove
them for television. Moreover, the new Act, as we have seen, greatly
hobbles local Bell operating companies' entry into long distance telephone service. But long distance service is provided in a national market. It is at best unclear how control over a few local switched networks can be translated into market power in the national long distance
market.
b. Measuring control
Once markets are defined, one needs to know who controls which
finns in those markets. The new Act perpetuates a time-honored failing
of broadcasting law in treating fonnal and infonnal integration as
worlds apart, when they are in fact two phenomena that exist on a
single continuum. Depending on the length and complexity of an informal, contractual relationship, it may occupy a spot on that line quite
close to a fonnal merger.
The new Act seems not to recognize this principle. For example, at
one point, the bill establishes rules limiting the television stations a
finn may own nationwide. 219 The Act does nothing, however, to limit
the number (or collective reach) of stations with which a television
network may affiliate nationwide. Yet, as my colleagues and I have

218. Or, if you prefer, the market for selling ears and eyeballs to advertisers.
219. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1), modifying 41 C.F.R 13.3555. Helpfully, the limit is expressed in terms of the collective reach of those stations, not the simple number of them.
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shown elsewhere, the distinction between a network's ownership of a
television station and its affiliation with another is a good deal more
formal than real.22 For example, the difference is quite small between
the rate at which affiliated stations, on the one hand, and owned stations, on the other, clear major networks' prime time programs.221 In a
similar vein, the new Act establishes limits on the number of radio
stations any firm may own in one local market, but does not count as
an "owned" station one that is staffed and programmed by another
under a "local marketing agreement," a form of joint venture that is
rather common in today's commercial radio broadcasting industry.222

°

c. Measuring Concentration
Conventional wisdom has it that the number of firms in a market
is, at best, only a partial measure of the extent to which firms within it
probably compete fiercely. Also important, certainly in markets with
less than a dozen firms, are the percentage shares of the market that
each firm controls. Not all firms are created equal and the impact on
market behavior of commercial practices or mergers depends partly on
whether the firms engaging in the questioned behavior are among those
created more equal than others.223
Again, the new Act largely perpetuates a method by which regulators measure acceptable levels of concentration by how many stations a
firm acquires, not by the size or power of those stations. Thus, for
example, one firm may own eight radio stations in a market of fortyfive or more.224 This applies regardless of whether those are the most
or least popular in the market or propagate a broad or a relatively
narrow signal.
A clever person might argue that, for purposes of measuring concentration, all stations should be treated as equal, because each has an
equal potential to be most productive. That might explain why the new
Act simply counts numbers for the radio multiple ownership rules, but
would not explain why it establishes national television station owner-

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

MlV, supra note 6, at 31-93.
NISS VOL. 11, supra note 18, at 260-66.
FCC Rules would count such stations. TLP, supra note 6, at 271-76.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 217, at 455-66.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(b)(l)(A), modifying 41 C.F.R. 733555(a).
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ship rules based on the collective reach of the owned stations.225
Why do I rate as "ugly" the failure of the new Act to engage in
serious competition analysis at several points? Not, I confess, because
this omission will do great hann to consumers. Multiple ownership of
radio and television stations or the grounds on which BOCs are allowed
into long distance do not seem to bear enormously on listener, viewer
or consumer welfare.
Rather, I object to the implications of this shoddy analysis. These
features of the new Act seem to bespeak an absence of genuine commitment to competition as the prime regulator of telecommunications
markets. These provisions appear to reflect instead a simple private
interest give and take, in which legislators bicker over a series of numbers - eight stations or seven stations per large radio market - rather
than deliberate over an important legislative principle. Why would we
not simply leave formal and informal consolidation to the antitrust
authorities, as we do for most other U.S. industries and markets?
4. The Problem of Censorship

Lucas Powe and I recently published both a book226 and a law
review article227 about the evils, the futility and the wastefulness of
censorship of the electronic media. 228 While neither is hot off the press,
both are still pretty wann, so I see little need to repeat our arguments
here. Further, I think my description, above, of the censorship features

225. /d. § 202(c)(1), modifying 47 C.F.R. 73.3555.
226. RBP, supra note 6, passim.
227. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 178, passim.
228. Both the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§
501-509) and the Parental Choice in Television Programming (/d. § 551, 552) section are excellent examples of futile, wasteful regulation. Anyone who cares to think about it can figure
out that no government official, bureau or commission can keep George Carlin's "Seven Dirty
Words" off the Internet, no matter how much legislators (pretend to) wish they could.
Similarly, common sense shows that to encode all television programming for "sexual,
violent or other indecent material" is not a manageable task. The Motion Picture Association of
America rates about 600 theatrical films, or about 1200 hours, every year. Let's compare the
volume of television programming. Assume that a 70-channel cable system averages 20 hours
of cablecasting per day. That's 1400 hours of programming every day. No one can intelligently,
responsibly, accurately and fairly encode 1400 hours of programming every day for "programming that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent material about which parents should be
informed before it is displayed to children." See id. § 551(b)(1).
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of the new statute229 is sufficiently non-neutral to convey my distaste
for most of them.
I do wish to add three points. First, as a whole, the censorship
features of the new Act are anti-cable. The indecency rules aimed at
the Internet cannot prove enforceable, but those aimed at cable will be.
Further, violence has pretty much been scrubbed from conventional
network television, but not from cable which is full of old network
shows that had lots of violence as well as movies and cable network
fare that are comparatively violent230 Whether those who voted for the
Act know it or not, it is cable that will bear the brunt of the bill's
censorship features.
Second, all these censorship features of the new Act - as all other
acts of censorship- at bottom reflect hostility to the programmer's (or
editor's) status or class or points of view. Although this is not stated in
the new Act, we all know that the V-chip proposal is not aimed at the
most violent fare on television - sports (especially football) and news
coverage of crime, war, and terrorism. The indecency provisions are
aimed at those obsessed with sexual acts, not those obsessed with racist
hatred or religious intolerance or greed. That is, the "indecency'' targeted by the new Act does not include racial epithets, expressions of religious bigotcy, or advertisements for alcohol and tobacco - each of
which may well be more damaging to young psyches than a joke about
farting or a picture of testicles. We say we care about children, but we
are at least equally concerned to punish speakers we dislike and to
absolve those with whom we are familiar and comfortable.
Third, the new Act will put some strains on existing constitutional
jurisprudence because of the clever (too clever, perhaps?) way in which
some of the censorship features are crafted. After telling cable operators
that they must carry smut, then Congress tells them to segregate it. The
Act may thus be portrayed as an attempt to shield children and to support operators' editorial preferences and control. The FCC shall manage
the V-chip system only if the industry does not volzmtarily undertake to
do so first. Consequently, the industry's response may be characterized
as private, rather than governmental, action.231 Although governmental

229. See supra text accompanying notes 140-77.
230. RBP, supra note 6, at 123.
231. To say that the claim is transparently preposterous, which it is, is not to say all that
much in terms of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Remember, this is the Court that told us that a
law that differentiated on the grounds of pregnancy did not distinguish between men and women. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court also told us that a law requiring
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censorship is forbidden by the first amendment, private censorship is
protected by it. 232
IV. CONCLUSIONS

I have argued that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is neither a
miracle drug nor a poison pill for what ails our telecommunications law
and policy. The new Act has good, bad, and ugly features.
How does it all balance out? That depends on what matters most to
you. I have a friend who buys and sells radio stations. At any given
time, he owns lots of them. He told me that the V-chip was the best
thing to happen to him in years. Why? Because, he believes, the presence of the V-chip sections got the White House interested in supporting the bill, so my friend got expanded radio group ownership rules.
What matters most to me? Two things. First, I think it is downright
shameful to pretend to enact a pro-competition policy, while continuing
to preserve the worst features of our old spectrum allocation policies,
exacerbating the anti-competitive, anti-efficiency effects of universal
service policy, and steadfastly refusing to ask (or to require the FCC to
ask) real questions about real competitive conditions in real markets.
My objection is not simply to the inelegance or intellectual shallowness
of these policies, but to the real harms they threaten to the goal of
competition: serving consumers efficiently. No one of these failings is
likely to cause "pretend competitive" markets to perform badly, but in
combination they may do much harm.
My second large objection to the new Act stems from the fact that
I continue to believe that the case has never been made for maintaining
a large, independent agency with industry-specific powers over telecommunications firms and markets. Perhaps we need a Federal Spectrum
Commission to manage spectrum assignment and to mediate interference
claims. Certainly, we need a Telecommunications Bureau to represent
us in international negotiations over frequency use and assignments. We
may need an Interconnection Department (or just an amendment to the
antitrust laws) to establish the principle that local telecommunications
carriers that possess market power must provide sophisticated and non-

separate seating, by race, on public transportation facilities provided both blacks and whites the
equal protection of the laws. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 494 (1954).
232. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire residents
cannot be forced to display "Live Free or Die" on their license plates).
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discriminatory access to other providers of allied or competing telecommunications services. But what other sound, important public policies
are reflected in the 1934 Communications Act or the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that cannot be pursued by agencies - like the FTC,
the SEC, the NLRB - that are not industry specific and so are much
less susceptible to capture by private interests? Without the Communications Act, neither Congress nor its constituents would assume that
government is charged with superintending communications in this
country.
These seem to be the larger questions that a true reform of U.S.
telecommunications law and policy would address. The 1996 Act not
only failed to address these questions, but created an even larger Federal Communications Commission, charged with even more responsibilities. One Commissioner reports that the new law will require the FCC
to conduct eighty rulemakings! 233 One reads the new Act in vain for
something that reflects Congressional awareness that the FCC may not
be omnipotent, its commissioners not omniscient. I find it difficult to
see how such an enlargement of the FCC and its duties can be squared
with a determination to reduce the extent of government management
of telecommunications and to increase the role of competition - i.e.,
discipline inflicted by consumers - on the industry.234
Finally, and perhaps most fortunately, I believe we can be quite
sure that all the matters I have raised in this Article are relatively short
term transitory issues. Telecommunications technology marches forward.
We cannot retard it any more than we can catch lightning in a bottle.
Some people are now using the Internet for long distance phone calls.
Who knows what technologies will dominate in 2025? Just as we now
snicker and guffaw over earlier attempts to regulate the telephone industry through the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 and the AT&T
consent decree of 1956,235 so will our grandchildren wonder what all
this fuss was about.
U.S. governments, both state and federal, have erected countless
entry barriers in the course of writing and rewriting telecommunications

233. FCC Comm'r Susan Ness, Remarks at the Public Policy Forum Series, Whmton School.
U. Penn (Feb. 22, 1996) (transcript available at hUp:l/www.fcc.gov/SpeechcsiNessfspsn604.txt).
Note, further, that a single rulemaking may well spawn dozens of individual rules. We arc
certainly looking at over 1,000 new FCC rules as a result of the new Act
234. For some years now, a soft drink has promoted itself as "The Uneola." Perhaps v.-e
might call the new Act the "Un-deregulation bill."
235. 1LP, supra note 6, 468-71.
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laws. Not one of them has withstood the critical analysis of those
blessed with hindsight. Technological change has circumvented them
all. To oversimplify one final time, to the extent that the new Act
destroys entry barriers, I would judge it a success while, to the extent
that it creates or strengthens them, I would judge it a failure.

